Blunder-2. THE HIMALAYAN BLUNDER

2.        THE HIMALAYAN BLUNDER

            No, with apology to Brig. J. P. Dalvi, I am not talking about his book by the same name, which kicked up a considerable controversy about the most crushing military defeat that modern India ever faced in 1962. In fact, the genesis of this debacle can be found in the erratic appreciation of India’s defence needs by the first government of free India under the premiership of Shri Jawahar Lal Nehru.

        An ambiguity and confusion overtook my mind, as I delved deep in this subject. Was it a blunder or simply a failure? Protracted thinking led me to the argument that had we lost the war to China despite our war-preparedness and diplomatic efforts, we could call it a ‘failure’, because, after all one side was bound to loose and definitely the weaker one. But we were not prepared for war, we failed to appreciate the new world order that was emerging on the ruins of Second World War and we could not move the world powers to protect Tibet from an imperialist China.  Mr. Nehru laboured under a megalomaniac dream of being a World leader without making the country strong. Hence it is appropriate to call the policies followed by our first government which culminated into the debacle of 1962, a BLUNDER.

The Emerging World order and the Non-alignment Movement. The year 1945 saw the end of II World War and emergence of victorious allied nations as a power block. In 1949 these countries formed a military alliance called NATO. To counter this threat the leftist countries regrouped themselves under the leadership of the USSR. At that time, China was just another country trying to get on its feet after being ravaged by Russia and Japan in the war. In the prevailing circumstances, the Indian government chose to provide leadership to the so called ‘Third World’, which was a conglomerate of underdeveloped countries trying to achieve bare existence. They called themselves non-aligned. Nehru pandered to his inflated ego by following the maxim ‘better to lead a band of fools than to follow the wise’, which was destined to be suicidal, as we will soon see.

            How could the non-aligned block be a factor in the world power equilibrium, nobody knows. India had a born enemy in Pakistan, who had made its intentions clear right at its birth. The imperialistic tendencies of China were no secret either. Nehru tried in vain, to tie down the dragon in 1954, in the frail strings of ‘Panchsheel’. Nehru's obsession with Panchsheel and his being an apostle of peace rose to near madness, when he turned down an offer of transfer of nuclear weapons technology made by John F Kennedy, then President of USA. In such a scenario, China saw a sea of opportunities in India being non-aligned. Being non-aligned was the first blunder for which India had to pay a heavy price – 38,000 sq.km. of its territory and the dragon knocking at its doors all through the days to come.

            Greatest disadvantage of being aligned to non-aligned was that India could not raise its voice against the accession of Tibet by China, and meekly allowed China to reach its borders, which later facilitated attack in 1962. It’s a common sense that you don’t allow buffer between bigger nations to evaporate so effortlessly. Not only did India fail in protecting Tibet, it, though inexplicably, was first to recognize the Chinese hegemony over Tibet. However, this tail-waggling was of no avail and could not prevent the Chinese aggression in 1962.

Post-Independence Euphoria:  So deep was the slumber induced by the post-independence euphoria that it took India 7 years to realize that China had made incursion into Indian territory, deep inside the Johnson line of 1865, in Aksai-chin. The accompanying map will clarify things:

Chinese started to construct Sikiang-Tibet road through Aksai Chin even before the occupation of Tibet. On completion of the project, they released a map showing area beyond Macartney-MacDonald Line (1899) in China. It was then the Nehru government awoke from slumber to realize the position on the ground.

Till September 1962, Chinese forces had advanced without firing a single bullet and taken up positions near Karakoram Pass in the North and Khurnak Fort in the South (see blue line on map). For 10 years the government of free India did not bother itself to consolidate its territory, because Nehru thought it was a barren, useless desert, not worthy of his attention. In October 1962 (20 Oct-21 Nov), the People’s Liberation Army advanced in Kashmir and NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) sectors well beyond the Line of Actual Control (LAC) into India inflicting a crushing defeat. International community particularly USA and USSR could not intervene due to their preoccupation with the ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’, when they had reached at the brink of a nuclear war.

            According to war experts, it is still an enigma as to why India did not use its Air Force. For China, using its war planes would have been very difficult as its air fields were at a long distance from the theatre of war and India was decidedly at advantage. Apparently, Nehru had lost courage to fight.

Defense Un-preparedness:  Despite clear indicators, Nehru failed to appreciate the threat India faced on Northern and Western borders. The budget allocation made by his government for Defense speaks volumes for this complacency.

            The first budget by an elected government (1950-51) had made a defense budget allocation which was about 26% of total budget which came down gradually to about 15% in the successive years. By today’s standards, the figures might look impressive, but when we compare it with the defence spendings of Pakistan, we are in for a shock. It made a whopping defence allocation of about 54% of total budget and continued with allocations around 50% in the years that followed. Prime Minister of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Bogra (April 1953-August 1955) had said that he would rather starve Pakistan than allow weakening of its defence. That was the commitment to country’s defence.

            Congress supporters may put forth the argument that this was precisely why Pakistan lagged behind in economic development vis-à-vis India. No doubt, economic indicators suggest that India is a fore-runner, but the distance is not in Kilometers. Moreover, political instability is the main reason for this small lag and not their higher defence spendings.

            This criminal neglect of defence preparedness was responsible for liquidation of buffer state of Tibet and the resultant shameful beating that India received at the hands of China in 1962.

            In short, the humiliating defeat at the hands of China and its continuing dangerous presence across northern borders is due to blunders of action and policy by Nehru government i.e. (a) Neglect of defence requirements, (b) Following non-aligned policy by aligning with poor and weak nations, (c) and thereby not trying to save the buffer state of Tibet.

Neglect of Defence Continues: Strangely, the successive Congress governments continued this neglect of defence preparedness and learned no lessons from history. Budget allocations remained at 10-12% of total budget. Per capita defence spending of $27 per annum is lowest in the world as compared to $44 that of China. No defence purchases were made during UPA rule (2005-2014). Bofors and Augusta Westland kick-backs made UPA to develop cold feet. Though purchases have been streamlined thereafter, and budget of 2015-16 saw an increase of 12.37% in defence budget, the picture still remains dismal. Surprisingly, even the BJP government seems to be neglecting this important aspect. In 2017-18 the defence allocation was at 13.6% of total budget. With two enemies staring in the eyes, this allocation needs to be increased to at least 20%.  Roads, railways and air strips in border areas are scanty, if not non-existent, which are wretchedly insufficient to take on China.

(to be continued…. )